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Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Regional Arrangement and 2011 Presidential Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: A Theoretical Assessment  Chime Chukwunonso Jideofor Department of Management and Accounting, Faculty of management sciences, Ladoke Akintola, University Of Technology, Ogbomos, Nigeria  Abstract In this study we interrogate the problems facing Nigeria social-political environment is the excruciating sentiment average Nigerian has on his ethnic group, with little passion attached to the country’s overall general well-being. Political violence in Nigeria has always been traced to this ‘monster’ (regional sentiment), that has persistently remained part of our existence. The 2011 general election, including that of the president, was adjudged to be the best Nigeria has ever had since 1999. After the pronouncement of the winner by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), post-election violence followed in its wake in the northern part of the country thereby, putting a big question mark on the election. This article has been designed to critically examine the issue of zoning arrangement in PDP and the presidential post-election violence. The objective of the study is to ascertain what accounted for post- election violence after the 2011 Presidential election in northern Nigeria. The study will be led by the following research question: Did the election of a southern president in the 2011 presidential election account for the 2011 post-election violence in northern Nigeria? The study is anchored on frustration aggression theory. The article is basically library research hence we relied on documentary method of data collection. We collected data from secondary sources. Such secondary sources are text books; journals; INEC publications, seminar, conference and workshop papers; magazines, newspaper and Internet materials. Descriptive and explanatory methods of analysis were adopted because the study is qualitative method. The paper revealed that the jettisoning of PDP zoning arrangement as evident in the emergence of a southerner as president generated so much tension that later to the wanton killing of lives, and destruction of properties after the results were announced.  Introduction It is very important to note that nomenclatures such as zoning, federal character, regionalism, and sectionalism to mention a few of them are all rooted in ethnicity. Politics in Nigeria has always been built around chronic ethnic sentiment. Richard constitution of 1946 split the country into four units; the colony, the western province, the Northern Province and the Eastern province. Albeit, the Richards constitution laid the foundation for federalism in terms of ethnic accommodation, but it was a complicating rather than a mitigating factor as it more or less legalized regionalism. The three regions East, West, and North, which emerged, were not homogenous and the colonial authorities did little to lessen the inherent ethnic differences. As Elaigwu (1988:79) opined that with the Richards constitution, Nigerians saw one another as strangers competing in a legislative setting for the big prize: the control of political power at the centre. They withdrew into their ethnic, ethno regional and geo-ethnic enclaves for mobilization in this competitive process. Generally, the ‘Mcpherson Constitution which abrogated the Richards constitution, confirmed regionalism and gave wider political power to regions. The natural corollary to this was the emergence of ethnic politics, which in turn heightened ethnic distrust and suspicion in Nigeria. In the north, emerged the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group in the east, the National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) dominated by the lgbos and in the West the Action Group (AG) dominated by the Yoruba. Dr Azikiwe attempt to get elected into the Federal House from the Yoruba dominated Western region was frustrated on the tribal sentiment that he was an lgbo and not a Yoruba. As Professor Echebe (1983) has observed, about Ziks”defect” in the west, That event in retrospect was the death of a dream Nigeria in which a citizen could live and work in any place of his choice anywhere, and pursue any legitimate goal open to his fellows; a Nigeria in which an Easterner might aspire to be premier in the west and a northerner become mayor of Enugu. Generally, Regional sentiment was equally evident in the 3rd republic. The ill fated fourth republic was superintended by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida a military head of state who dilly-dallied for over eight years with his transition programme. Babangida’s government conducted its presidential election on 12th June 1993 and the winner was presumed to be Chief MKO Abiola a southerner. But the election unfortunately was annulled by IBB led government in what many believed was premised on vested interest. That singular annulment took regional agitation to a worrisome dimension. A group known as National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), was formed with majority of its members from the west relied around MKO in what they believed was their mandate. The 
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polity was heated to a boiling point, which made IBB to hurriedly relinquish power to Chief Ernest Shonekon, a westerner, in what he called Interim National Government (ING). However, that did not stop the agitations, and to worsen it, a Lagos High Court had earlier on declared Shonekon led government illegal. Gen. Sani Abacha sacked the Interim National Government and assumed the head of state. Abacha resorted to use of force in trying to intimidate the agitators of June 12 elections. Most of the NADECO and AFINAFERE Chieftains who were at the vanguard of the struggle, went exiles, many of them where also subsequently incarcerated including the presumed winner MKO Abiola. The very foundation of Nigeria state was shaking to its base. Nigeria became a pariah state in the comity of nations; a lot of sanctions From the West were placed. It was at the peak of that tension that Gen Sani Abacha died when he was planning his transforming himself into a civilian president. Gen. Abudusalami .Abubakar took over from Abacha and did not hesitate to start a transition program. Though at that time, the presumed winner of June 12 was already dead. He died while in custody. The demise of the presumed winner of June 12, election chief M.K.O Abiola and the incumbent head of state General Sani Abacha, open a new vista to Nigeria political activities. Though the political situation of Nigeria at that time was on precipice, and Nigeria political elites knew that the onus was on them to fashion a means of holding the country together. Undoubtedly, the crux of the issue was on how to placate the south western part of the country whose agitations have reached a crescendo. It was against this background that Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in their formative stage adopted zoning, which connotes giving adequate privileges and backings to a particular ethnic cum geographical zone or region in ensuring they produce the president or any political office, a phenomenon conceptualized to pacify regional agitations as spearheaded by their political elites. Of course the prevailing circumstances then necessitated their starting with the southwestern part of the country. However, the zoning formula for presidential seat was enshrined in P constitution. As such, the Southern geo-political zone was to take the shot of the presidential seat resulting from the zoning system. President Osegun Obasanjo had a smooth ride in winning PDP presidential flag during their Jos convention courtesy of the zoning arraignment. In congruence with e zoning arraignment, Obasanjo ruled for eight (8) years and handed the residential power to late president Umaru Yardua in a manner many believed was a manifestation of Obasanjo’s (do or die affair threat) in 2007. The death of Musa Yar’Adua on May 5th 2010 and the subsequent swearing in of his deputy Dr. Goodluck Johnathan contributed in heating up once again Nigeria political firmament. The north wanted to retain power till 2015 since the south had completed theirs through Obasanjo 8 years in power. From then onward, a political battle line was drawn between the pro zoning group basing their argument on PDP constitution and the anti zoning group that anchors theirs on the supremacy of Nigeria constitution. Political alliance was formed to ensure the success of zoning. Major northern political actors mainly from PDP extraction excluding CPC opposition party presidential candidate Muhamadu Buhari and few others in the opposition parties, formed a group know as G—15 led by Aihaji Adamu Ciroma. This group of northern political elites had one assignment, to let go individual interest and ambition in ensuring they bring one candidate from the north whom they are going to give their general supports. The character of Nigeria politics did not allow these northern political actors to look for another political party knowing that such move could amount to avoidable dissipation of political energy. Thus, they must remain in the political party in power in slugging out who becomes the PDP flag bearer. The. G-15 conducted election among the presidential contestants from the north in PDP. Among the contestant are former military leader of Nigeria lbrahim Babangida, former Vice President Aihaji Atiku Abubakar, former Security Adviser to the president Alahaji Gusau. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar emerged as the PDP northern political elite candidate but that did not mean much as he was defeated by the incumbent president Dr. Goodluck Johnatan during PDP primaries election. The emergence of president Jonathan as the PDP presidential flag bearer and his subsequent victory in 2011 presidential elections under the platform of PDP was perceived by other presidential contenders especially in the North as an injustice, a gross negation of PDP zoning arrangement and a plot to oust the North from the mainstream of Nigeria’s political environment. Nigeria state was therefore plunged into post election violence manifested in wanton destruction of lives and properties especially in the northern part of the country. It is against this background that this article attempts a study on the concept of zoning in Nigeria political lexicon as -implicated in 2011 post presidential election violence. The article shall argue that the election of a southerner in the 2011 presidential election accounted for the 2011 post-election violence in northern Nigeria.  Theoretical Framework In view of the relevance of theoretical framework to empirical research, this paper is principally anchored on frustration-aggression theory. This theory had become imperative in this paper because of its effectiveness and merit among other means for the study and understanding of social system and related phenomena. In 1939, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears published a monograph on aggression in which they presented what has come to be known as the frustration-aggression hypothesis (F-A). This hypothesis proved to have an immense impact. It appears to have influenced current Western thinking on aggression more profoundly 
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than any other single publication. For more than three decades, the F-A hypothesis has guided, in one way or another, the better part of the experimental research on human aggression (Geen, 1972; Zillmann, 1979). Perhaps more importantly, however, the views of aggression that it involves seem to have become widely adopted and accepted; they have become commonplaces. This popular success may have various sources. First the principal hypothesis is uncomplicated and easy to grasp. The theory is generally well structured and clearly articulated, a fact that again facilitates comprehension. Second, the theory does not involve overly abstract concepts or elaborate procedures. It is very close to common sense — seeming to be built on it. Finally, as Selg (1971) observed, the theory tends to provide a justification for behaving aggressively: As to the principal hypothesis, Dollard et al. (1939) posited “that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression”. Frustration, in this context, was specified as the thwarting of a goal response, and a goal response, in turn, was taken to mean the reinforcing final operation in an ongoing behavior sequence. At times, however, the term ‘frustration’ is used to refer not only to the process of blocking a person’s attainment of a reinforcer but also to the reaction to such blocking. Consequently, ‘being frustrated’ means both that one’s access to inforcers is being thwarted by another party (or possibly by particular circumstances) and that one’s reaction to this thwarting is one of annoyance. was soon recognized that the initial claims — (a) that aggression is always used on frustration and (b) that frustration always leads to aggression — were far too general. These blaims made frustration both a necessary and sufficient condition for aggression. Miller (1941) was quick to retract the latter part of the proposal. Quite obviously, frustrations do not cause hostile or aggressive outbursts by necessity. Potential outbursts may be effectively inhibited or may result in alternative actions, such as the pursuit of other, more readily available reinforcers. Miller therefore rephrased the second part of the hypothesis to read: “Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is instigation to some form of aggression”. According to this reformulation, frustration actuates motivational forces that are diffuse rather than specific to aggression. It is assigned the properties of a general drive. Such apparent moderation has not been applied to the first pat of the original F-A hypothesis, however. Miller (1941) found the generality of this claim both defensible and useful. The revised F-A hypothesis thus maintains the following: (a) Frustration instigates behavior that may or may not be hostile or aggressive. (b) Any hostile or aggressive behavior that occurs is caused by frustration. In other words, frustration is not a sufficient, but a necessary, condition for hostility and aggression (Zillmann, 1979). Expatiating further, and using deprivation as a factor that reinforces frustration, Garr (1970) contends that relative deprivation is a necessary condition for violence; relative deprivation being a perceived discrepancy between man’s value expectations and their value capabilities. He maintains that value expectations are goods and conditions of life to which people believed they are rightly entitled, while in order hand, according to him, values capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are callable of attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them. He suggests some variables that affect the intensity of emotional responses to the perception of deprivation. The first proposition is that man see between what he seeks and what seems to be attainable, the greater his anger and consequent disposition to aggression, the second proposition boarders on the greater the intensity of man’s expectations, the greater their when they meet unexpected or increase resistance. Furthermore, Davis (1972) opines that the outbreak of violence is a function of frustration that results from a short term decline in achievement, following a long-term increase that generates expectation about continuing increase. He is of the view that violet revolutions do not occur during periods of prolonged, abject or worsening situation, contrary to the Marxian expectations or even the assumption of Alexis de Tocqueille, rather revolution occurs during periods of relative prosperity and improvement. Prosperity offers opportunity for comparative analysis of progress of each component of the society. Thus, the idea of inequality is often muted. To this end, Okanya (1999) argues that it is inequality perceived as inequality on the basis of power, status and wealth, and predicated by ethnic, religious, class or political configurations, in turn, become basis for resentment.  Application of the theory Frustration-aggression theory could be gainfully employed and form basis for analyzing and explaining the circumstances surrounding the zoning of the presidency and the political violence that greeted the result of the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. Prior to 1999 The north has been dominating the political landscape of the country by always having one of their own as either the military head of state or civilian president. In fact the victory of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 was made possible because the north decided to relinquish power to the southern region so as to pacify the south west on what many saw as an injustice. That is the cancellation of June 12 election. No wonder the two major presidential candidates in 1999 were Chief Olu Falae and the eventual winner Chief Olusegun Obasanjo both were from southwest. An understanding was struck in PDP which holds that power should return to the north in what was tagged Zoning. Obasanjo covertly wanted to extend his tenure 
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but that was resisted since it was believed his tenure and that of the south has expired. 2007 election that brought Umaru Yar’Adua was seen by both local and international observers as the worst election ever in Nigeria but little violence was recorded as compared to 2011 because a northerner won and as such zoning arraignment was held. But all that changed when Yar’Adua died before he could finish his first tenure paving way for his vice who happened to come from the south and as such thwarting the chances of the north finishing their tenure in line with zoning arraignment. The frustration was heightened after every efforts made by some northern political elites from going to court to reducing their candidates were to no avail. To this end, the political violence witnessed in some northern state is a dependent variable, while the zoning of the presidency is an independent variable that is the main causative factor to the political violence. Thus, the teeming unemployed youths that were aggrieved and frustrated were to take to the streets when it was clear that their geo-political zone (i.e. the North) had lost the presidential contest. Besides, the violet activities of these youths were equally reinforced by the utterances of their political elite and presidential contenders cum religious leaders who perceived the emergence of the southern president as a ploy to oust them in Nigeria’s political spheres. Specially, it was/is the unrepentant believe of the northerners, going by the size of their geographical spread that political power as it affects the presidential seat is their exclusive concern, contrary, however, what is perceived as a long spell of southern presidential hegemony since inception of democratic rule in 1999, has in no doubt, created resentment and frustration and aggression phenomenon among them. The Election of a Southerner in the 2011 and for the 2011 Post-Election Violence in Northern Nigeria Winning PDP primaries has nothing to do with superior manifesto. It has nothing to do with the credibility of the candidate and as such what matters most is the position of the Commander-in-Chief who has the state apparatus at his whims. No wonder Ogar (2010) ii his article “Reflections on the zoning Debate for presidency 2011 between Atiku and Jonathan’s Aspiration for Yar’Adua’s second tenure asserts that “the debate for presidency 2011 has not been over the manifestoes or capability of the candidates for the position but rather on which religion and region should produce the candidate. This debate has rather pre-occupied the polity to the extent that many are made to assume that until the president comes from a particular zone, he/she is likely to deliver better”. The formation of PDP as a political party and the way it operates ignited frustration among the northern political elites who in a bid to stop the emergency of the incumbent went and conducted their own election just to increase the chances of one of their own by reducing the number of northern aspirants. That arrangement favored Atiku Abubakar who emerged as northern sole candidate. With the north having only one candidate, it would have been a free and easy ride for Atiku to win the PDP presidential ticket. But that was not to be. Table 1 and 2 show the result of PDP primaries in 2006, and their result in 2010, a period of just 4 years gap. The shift in the voting par tern of the northern delegates’ sequel on how they voted against their own turned out a riddle to most northerners. 4 years before the 2011 PDP presidential primaries the north voted overwhelmingly for Yara’Adua towing the line of the then president Olusegun Obasanjo. In spite the zoning arraignment northern electorate appeared incapacitated in delivering Atiku who was standing as the northern sole candidate at a time they were yet to complete their tenure. In fact Atiku Abubakar could not even win his Adamawa home state. Such development was possible because the PDP as a political party is built on a very weak institution and thus their activities is not guided by principle and as such any supposedly rule or regulation purportedly meant to guide the party can always be thwarted by the sitting president who also is the leader of the party. President Jonathan emergence as the PDP flag bearer as shown in table 2 took the agitations of majority of PDP party stalwart from northern extraction to an alarming level since every of their efforts to avail zoning came to naught. Table 1: Results of PDP Presidential primaries held on Saturday December 16, 2006, in Abuja S/N NAMES OF CONTESTANTS RESULTS/NUMBER OF VOTES 1 Musa Yar’Adua 3,024 2 Rochas Okorocha 372 3 Aliyu Gusau 271 4 Jerry Gana 165 5 Buba Marwa 127 6 Ebitu Ukiwe 17 7 Mike Akhigbe 13 8 Albert Horsfall 8 9 Sarah Jibril 4 10 Raiph Uwechue 3 11 Abdrease Sawa 3 12 Mamman Kotangora 0 13 Invalid votes 94  Total votes 4,010 Source: http://www.africamasterweb.com/AdPDp2007ConyentionResults.htm.24/11/12 
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Though, it is not the focus of this paper to either validate or invalidate that 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was relatively free and fair, but a situation where the actual votes cast were almost 97% of the registered voters as recorded in most south south and south east states raises a lot of questions on the purported credibility. It is an obvious truth that apart from very few exceptions, votes in Nigeria always toe the line of the sitting president and it is more evident when the sitting presidents is in contention too. President Goodluck emergence as the winner of 2011 Presidential election as announced by the INEC chairman Prof Attahiru Jega triggered the violence that followed the result. Also activities of some groups that supported some presidential candidates of the ruling party, especially those that supported General Ibrahim Badamasi I3abangida, as well as those that promoted the issues of regionalism also contributed to the eruption of the crisis. Below is the result of 2011 presidential election. Party Total scores of votes Percentage  CAN 2,079,151 5.41% ADC 51,682 0.14% ANPP 917,021 2.40% APS 23,740 0.06% ARP 12,264 0.03% BNPP 422,272 0.12% CPC 12,214,853 31,98% FRESH 34,331 0.09% HDP 12.023 0.03% LDPN 8,472 0.02 MPP 16,492 0.04% NCP 26,376 0.07% NMDP 25,938 0.07% NTP 19,744 0.05% PDC 83,243 0.21% PDP 22,495,187 58,89% PMP 56,248 0.15% PPP 54,203 0.14% SAMP 11,544 0.03% UNPD 21,203 0.06% Source: Aligo, 2011:3. The post-election violence that had threatened the political stability and corporate existence of Nigeria was credited to utterances of the northern political elites and religious leaders after their efforts to intimidate Jonathan to respect the concept of zoning failed. Thus, according to Barret (2011), throughout the campaign that preceded the presidential polls the leitmotiv of General Buhari’s main argument was simply that he would punish the unrighteous and install a new order of discipline society. In addition, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) had urged Jonathan not to contest in the elections after consultation with the vocal minority of the Moslem-North coupled with preaching of Imams and Mallams concerning the inevitability of political mayhem should a “Kaferi” win to rule over the believer, rather provided moral anchor to rioters who perennially executed the dastardly, act of killings (Offoaro, 2011). As a result of the foregoing, according to Human Rights Watch (2011), Buhari supporters launched demonstrations in the streets of northern Nigeria. The protest turned violent in 12 northern states as mobs burnt the homes, vehicles and properties of ruling party stalwart, most of whom were Muslim, and traditional leaders who were seen as supporting the ruling party, and burning churches across the northern party of the country. As the violence spread, mobs of Christians dominated communities in Kaduna state retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties (Human Right Watch, 2011). Perhaps the Climax of the violence in the North was the gruesome killing of seven (7) National youth Services coups members serving in Bauchi State. The gory details released by the Nigerian police force on June 3, 2011 of post-election violence in the north shows that 520 Nigerians were killed in Kaduna and Niger States. Kaduna alone accounted for 518 of the deaths. In addition, 175 churches, 46 mosques and over thousand houses and hundreds of vehicles were burnt. 22,000 were known to have disappeared in Kaduna state as a result of the post election violence of (the Nation, June 2, 2011). To Offoaro (2011), the Post Presidential election violence in the North was in reaction to Mohammad Buhari’s loss of presidential election to Goodluck Jonathan. According to him, the ground for the perennial senseless mayhem had been prepared long ago. As such, the youths that got involved in the act were simply incited by the utterances of the northern leaders such as Adamu Ciroma, whose frustration as the leader of northern political forum was obvious. His inciting words threaten the corporate existence of the nation. In the 
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same manner, Mohammed (2011) avers that the post-election violence that erupted in the North particularly Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna and Niger, preceded from the declaration of President Jonathan of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as the winner of the 2011 presidential election by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). According to him, the unfortunate situation of violence resulted in the destruction of property and homes, and untimely death of many Nigerians especially youth corps members serving in Bauchi State. He however, regrets that such repugnant and uncivilized act of killing and destruction could be visited on Nigerians at the period when local as well as international observers had expressed satisfaction with the conduct of April polls and adjudged them the best so far. According to Human Rights Watch (2011), the April presidential election had divided Nigeria along ethnic and religious lines. As election results trickled in on April 17, and it became clear that Buhari had lost, his supporters took to the street of northern town and cities to protest what they alleged to be rigging of the election results. But to Onabule (2011), the circumstances surrounding the post presidential election violence are traceable to presidential electoral results which according to him, were fraught with manipulations. To this end, he contends that since the elections and the results were controversial, angry reaction of the people should be no surprise. He queries whether it could rightly be ascribed as their birth-right to rule Nigeria of those who protested against the elections. Violence according to him is an integral part of a political system and could only be intolerable when it is patterned along religious lines. Also the agitators for zoning in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), led by Adamu Ciroma, Yakassai, IBB, Raymond Dokpesi and others, had threatened that Nigeria would be ungovernable without the president of northern extraction of 2011. These stalwarts of the PDP heated the country to the boiling point in the months leading to the PDP primaries through incendiary comments and language of annihilation. They prepared the minds of the masses of the North for a no-compromise stance. Indeed, the loss of presidential ticket of the PDP by Atiku Abubakar to President Jonathan was greeted in the North with street protests. These political demagogues, as super headed by desperadoes never went back to the youth in the North that they had changed their minds of the issue of zoning. They never abandoned the struggle even though it waned in the days leading to the April 16, 2011 presidential pool. So, the masses in the North, beside the infections popularity of Buhari in the North, saw in the retired general the fulfillment of the northern aspiration to lead Nigeria through zoning.  Conclusion The paper examined PDP zoning arrangement and 2011 post election violence in Nigeria. We contended that the emergence of a southerner heated the polity and consequently resulted in the 2011 presidential post election violence. To assign an empirical meaning to the forgoing contention, we postulated a research question that directed the study. Moreso, broad and specific objectives of the study which derived strictly from the focus of the study were outlined and empirical significance of the paper articulated. Furthermore, we embarked on the review of the extant literature relevant to the study to establish whether the research question we raised for empirical investigation has been satisfactory addressed. The review created a gap which the study addressed. To do this we postulated a hypothesis that was linked in a consistent manner to the research question and objective of the study. We adopted Frustration Aggression analysis framework to provide philosophical justification for our hypothesis. To generate relevant information for the study, we utilized descriptive method. The mass of qualitative data generated was analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis. The result of the data analysis confirmed our hypothesis. The finding reveals that the emergence of president Jonathan a southerner at a time the north was yet to finish their own 8 years tenure after Obasanjo has finished his heated up the polity as orchestrated and masterminded by northern political elite that incited their people never to accept any president that was not from their extraction. That action taken by the northern political and religious elite led to the violence that followed the announcement of the presidential election won by president Goodluck a southerner. Our findings also revealed the nature and structure of PDP. The party is a conglomerate of strange bedfellows who have no uniformity of ideology or philosophy, and as such making the party an instrument through which political opportunists use in primitive capital accumulation and that accounted for the gross desperations that often characterized their elections. Also revealed is the enormous power the president wields in the party (PDP). In fact the party is always at the whims and caprices of the president; such development is not good for democracy. Also Nigeria populace pays little attention to manifestoes and electoral program. Instead they are immersed in religious/ethnic sentiment, and that has giving an awful definition to our kind of politics. To worsen it all, we discovered that the ethnic sentiment as represented by zoning has little or no positive effect to the downtrodden Nigerians who are at the receiving end of the whole malady. Zoning is the sentiment the political 
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